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Abstract 
 
This paper presents a model of autonomy called 
autonomy with regard to an attribute applicable to 
cognitive and not cognitive artificial agents. Three 
criteria (global / partial, social / nonsocial, absolute  / 
relative) are defined and used to describe the main 
characteristics of this type of autonomy. A software 
agent autonomous with regard to the mobility 
illustrates a possible implementation of this model.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
Since the second half of the Nineties, autonomous 
agents are used more and more in the design and in the 
implementation of complex computer systems. The 
association of the concepts of agent and autonomy was 
explored and commented on in many theoretical 
works, primarily in the MultiAgent Systems (MAS) 
area. A first point of view which was developed by 
researchers such as Jennings and Wooldridge, or 
Franklin and Graesser was to consider autonomy as a 
global property, i.e. a property which applies to the 
agent in its totality. 
For Jennings and Wooldridge [7], “an agent is a 
computer system situated in some environment, and 
that is capable of autonomous action in this 
environment in order to meet its design objectives”. 
The situated aspect means that the agent perceives its 
environment and that it is able to modify it.  Autonomy 
means that the agent is able to act without the direct 
intervention of human beings or other agents, and that 
it is able to control its own actions and its internal 
state. For the authors, autonomous agents are not an 
innovation because systems like software daemons (ex: 
xbiff) or a simple thermostat can be classified as 
autonomous agents. 
Franklin and Graesser [6] synthesize their point of 
view on the agents with the following definition: “an 
autonomous agent is a system situated within and a 
part of an environment that senses that environment 
and acts on it, over time, in pursuit of its own agenda 
and so as to effect what it senses in the future”. For the 
authors, the software agents are present in many fields 
but any software program is not an agent: for example, 
according to their definition a payroll program cannot 
be considered as an agent. On the contrary, a 
thermostat fully satisfies their definition of an agent, 
i.e. an entity provided with autonomy. 
The main purpose of the autonomy model that we 
propose is to remove a major defect present in the two 
models outlined previously: the global aspect of 
autonomy. Indeed, a problem of global autonomy is 
that it is carrying paradox and confusion [8]. Let us 
illustrate this problem with an example. The definition 
of an autonomous agent as an agent able to act without 
the direct intervention of other agents and having a 
control on its own actions and its internal state is not 
entirely satisfactory. One can notice that even the 
human agents do not have this control neither on their 
internal state nor on all the actions they carry out. 
However, a (partial) autonomy of a human agent 
cannot be seriously questioned. This apparent paradox 
seems to result from an insufficient decomposition of 
the agent. 
Moreover, as many researchers had already noticed, 
autonomy is not an ordinary property but a complex 
property. More precisely, our work led us to 
distinguish two categories of properties of deeply 
different nature: qualities and attributes [10]. Qualities 
characterize properties with vague and elastic 
contours, difficult (perhaps impossible) to have an 
intimate knowledge. They are properties which content 
changes according to the point of view which one can 
have. They authorize multiple modelizations and 
different interpretations, when these interpretations are 
not contradictory. Some properties which can be 
identified as qualities are autonomy and intelligence. 
Attributes are properties intrinsically less difficult to 
encircle than qualities. Examples of attributes are 
mobility, replication or perception. They are generally 
reduced to a mechanism with one or more well defined 
procedures. Contrary to qualities, it is always possible 
to say if an agent has or does not have a specific 
attribute. Attributes play a significant role in the type 
of autonomy which we propose. 
Lastly, in the MAS field several models of 
autonomy were designed for goal-directed cognitive 
agents. For such an agent, a goal corresponds to a 
cognitive representation which an agent has of the 
world in which it is immersed. It results that these 
models of autonomy are not appropriate to non 
cognitive agents. The model of artificial autonomy 
described in section 4 is sufficiently general to apply to 
cognitive and non cognitive agents. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 
presents the main characteristics of the autonomy 
models generally associated to artificial agents. In the 
next section, the significant features of these models 
are used to define a set of criteria which will be used to 
compare these models and to introduce the autonomy 
with regard to an attribute. Lastly, section 4 will 
describe the theoretical and practical aspects of this 
model and some possible extensions. 
 
2. Artificial Autonomy approaches 
 
Autonomy is a typical example of what we have 
called a quality. Indeed, autonomy characteristics seem 
difficult to be synthesized with only one theory or 
model. In fact, reducing autonomy to a single model 
removes the essence of this property. This is why 
many models of autonomy were proposed by 
researchers in the Artificial Intelligence area. Various 
aspects can be brought out from these models:  the 
organic autonomy of biological inspiration (Varela, 
Bourgine), the social autonomy based on the power 
relationships between agents (Castelfranchi, Scerri) 
and the decisional autonomy founded on the choice of 
the agent (Barber, Vendryès), only to quote the most 
representative types of autonomy.  
The autonomy models briefly outlined below 
partially illustrate the significant disparity of the points 
of view generated by this property. 
The works of Luck and D’Inverno [9] on autonomy 
is integrated into a more general theory on the 
interactions between agents being based on the 
concepts of goal and motivation. The authors 
distinguish two very different points of view about 
autonomy: autonomy as the possibility for the agent to 
generate its own goals and autonomy as relations of 
dependence of an agent upon others. According to the 
first point of view, autonomous agents generate their 
own goals from their own motivations. According to 
the second point of view, the autonomy of an agent is 
modulated by the existence of relations of dependence 
between agents. This distinction separates what we 
will call thereafter social autonomy and nonsocial 
autonomy. 
Barber and al. [1], [2], consider autonomy as the 
possibility for an agent to influence the decision-
making process in the resolution of a given problem. 
Four levels of autonomy are defined. First level: the 
agent carries out the orders which are provided to it by 
another agent. Second level: the agent collaborates 
with other agents in order to achieve a common goal. 
Third level: the agent plans and carries out its own 
actions. Lastly, on the fourth level, the agent plans the 
actions for itself and for other agents. The agent is 
completely autonomous when it completely manages 
the decision-making process. It is partially autonomous 
when it shares this decision-making with other agents. 
Finally an agent which does not take part in this 
process is heteronomous. 
Castelfranchi and Falcone [3], [4], connect the 
concept of autonomy to the concept of dependence. 
They explain why on the one hand, autonomy is a 
relational concept - relation between an active entity 
and its environment or other active entities (social 
autonomy) -, and why on the other hand this relation 
also derives from the properties of the internal 
architecture of the entity. 
Adjustable autonomy describes the property of an 
autonomous system to change its level of autonomy 
among several levels while the system continues to 
function. A level of autonomy indicates a particular 
distribution between manual operations and automatic 
operations [5]. The distribution of autonomy 
dynamically changes in order to optimize the global 
performances of the system [12]. 
 
3. Criteria for a partial classification 
 
In order to compare in a uniform manner the 
autonomy with regard to an attribute and the preceding 
models, three criteria of analysis were defined: 
- Autonomy as a global or partial property of the 
agent   
- Autonomy as a social or nonsocial property  
- Autonomy as an absolute or relative property. 
 
Global or partial autonomy. Autonomy is said 
global when the definition applies to the entire agent. 
In the field of MAS, researchers generally use the 
expression “autonomous agent” [6] [7]. Another 
definition which typically illustrates this global aspect 
of autonomy is:  autonomy is the condition of a person 
or a community who determines by itself the law to 
which it is subjected.   In this definition, this quality 
also applies to the entity considered (agent, individual 
and group) in its totality. On the other hand, the nature 
of the law determined by the entity is not specified. We 
interpret this general information in the following way: 
as soon as an agent is able to create a law, it is globally 
autonomous. By replacing the concept of law by the 
concept of goal, we can qualify the model presented in 
[9] as global autonomy. 
Autonomy is partial when the property does not 
apply any more to the entire agent but to a part of it. 
The agent is in this case autonomous with regard to 
something. The model presented in [2] can be 
described as an example of partial autonomy because 
the autonomy is defined for each agent goal and the 
agent can be non autonomous (heteronomous) with 
regard to a specific goal. 
 
Social or nonsocial autonomy. Autonomy is 
described as social when its definition or 
characterization explicitly refers to one (or several) 
other(s) agent(s). It is nonsocial in the contrary case. 
The (X, Y, B) triplet defined in [4] perfectly 
characterizes social autonomy: the autonomy of agent 
X from agent Y about goal B. The presence of agent Y 
is essential to the various variations of this model 
(collaborative autonomy, non collaborative autonomy, 
etc). Models which use a decision-making process 
shared by several agents, as defined in adjustable 
autonomy [12] or in [2] are also and naturally models 
of social autonomy. The agents considered in the 
models of social autonomy are not of unspecified 
nature but are cognitive agents, i.e. provided with a 
certain type of intelligence. 
The autonomy presented in [9] is nonsocial because 
it is based on the possibility of an agent to generate a 
goal without implying the presence of another agent. 
However, it should be noted that a model of autonomy 
described as nonsocial does not mean that this model is 
inapplicable when several agents are in relation. This 
qualifier simply means that the definition of the model 
does not impose the presence of another agent. 
 
Absolute or relative autonomy. Autonomy is 
absolute when only one level of autonomy is defined: 
the agent (or part of the agent) is autonomous or is not 
autonomous [9].   
Autonomy is relative when several levels of 
autonomy are defined. The interest is to be able to 
define a measurement of the autonomy of an agent. In 
[2], the status of the agent can pass from simple 
executant to decision maker. 
It must be noticed that we distinguish carefully 
types of autonomy and levels of autonomy. A type of 
autonomy underlines the nature of this one: autonomy 
of goals, autonomy of plan, autonomy from the 
environment, etc. Our work on autonomy concerns a 
specific type of autonomy: autonomy with regard to an 
attribute. 
 
Summary. The preceding criteria are useful 
- To analyze existing models: the autonomy of an 
agent presented in [2] is partial (because defined for 
each goal), relative (several levels of autonomy were 
identified) and social (some relations of dependence 
exist between the agents). The model developed in [9] 
is a global autonomy model (the agent is able or not 
able to create a goal, its nature not being specified), 
absolute (only one level is defined) and nonsocial (the 
presence of another agent is not essential), and 
- To design new models: we developed a model of 
autonomy called autonomy with regard to an attribute. 
This autonomy is partial, absolute and nonsocial. It is 
(1) partial, because it applies only to a part of the 
agent: a specific attribute, (2) absolute: the agent is 
autonomous or is not autonomous with regard to this 
attribute, (3) nonsocial: the model does not require the 
presence of a second agent (Table 1). 
 
Table 1.  Partial taxonomy of some autonomy models.  
 
global partial social non social absolute relative 
Barber  X X   X 
Luck X   X X  
Sanchis  X  X X  
 
 
4. Autonomy with regard to an Attribute 
 
Autonomy with regard to an attribute is a model of 
decisional autonomy. It is stated in the following way:  
an agent is autonomous with regard to an attribute A if 
it can choose in a nondeterministic way a policy of use 
p among several and if it can change this one during its 
execution time. 
An attribute corresponds to a simple and non 
ambiguous property of an agent. A policy of use means 
in our context a succession of actions which carries out 
a particular and well identified functioning mode. Let 
us illustrate the concepts of attribute and use policies 
with two examples:  replication and mobility.  
Replication is an attribute which makes it possible 
for an agent to create a clone of itself on the local or a 
remote host.  The diversity of replication policies can 
(among other possibilities) come from the replication 
rate (one and only one clone per site, not more than 
one clone per site, at least one clone per site) and from 
replication hosts (replication on all the sites accessible 
to the agent, sites meeting a specific criterion). 
Another example of attribute is mobility. It is this 
attribute which will be used to illustrate the various 
aspects of the model. 
 
4.2. Model 
 
Two elements characterize autonomy with regard to 
an attribute: 
 - A set of operating modes of this attribute  
 - A two-component choice module. 
 
Functioning modes. If mobility is taken as an 
example of an attribute, one can distinguish various 
migration policies: 
- Navigation according to a route (the site of arrival 
is different from the starting site)  
- Circular navigation (the site of arrival is the 
starting site)  
- Navigation directed according to a certain 
criterion (ex: transfer to the less loaded host or to the 
site having the greatest free disk space)  
- Random navigation (the next site to reach is 
chosen at random). 
Circular navigation and navigation according to a 
route consist of several elementary hops. Other 
operating modes require only one transfer: directed 
navigation and random navigation are mono-hop 
strategies. 
Broadly speaking, the set of policies can be static or 
dynamic. It is static if the number or the nature of an 
operating mode cannot be modified after the agent 
creation. It is dynamic in the contrary case. To 
simplify, we considered only static sets of policies. 
Indeed, the implementation of a dynamic set of 
policies can induce a substantial modification of the 
choice module [11].  
 
Choice Module. The decision-making process used 
to choose a policy does not obligatorily imply a 
possibility of reasoning, rational choice or cognitive 
structure related to a particular model of intelligence. 
Indeed, the module of choice splits up into two parts: a 
deterministic component and a nondeterministic 
component.  
Provided with inputs and outputs, we will say that a 
component is deterministic if to the same inputs always 
correspond the same outputs. It is not deterministic if 
at two different moments T and T ', the same inputs 
can produce different outputs. The terms of inputs and 
outputs were selected for simplicity reasons and must 
be understood in our context in their most general 
meaning (internal or external conditions, stimuli, 
states, etc).  
outputs
Pi
Pj
Choice
 Deterministic Choice
Nondeterministic
inputs
inputs
outputs
 
Figure 1. Choice Module. 
The deterministic part of the choice module is 
provided with N functioning policies Pi (1≤i≤N, N>1). 
With the mobility example, migration policies could be 
the ones previously presented. 
The nondeterministic part includes an additional 
policy P0 corresponding to the empty policy. It means 
that no policy is triggered by the agent. It models the 
situation where, although the choice module of an 
attribute A was activated, no policy of A is started: 
there is an inhibition of the policy resulting from the 
deterministic choice.  
That means that after the activation of the 
nondeterministic part of the choice module, the policy 
Pj (0≤j≤N) finally elected can be different from the 
policy Pi previously selected by the deterministic 
component. 
Each part of the choice module has its own utility. 
The presence of the deterministic module of choice 
provides the agent with a coherent behavior (rational 
choice) directed by the conditions of inputs. The 
nondeterministic module of choice ensures the agent 
the decoupling between its autonomy and its 
monitoring. It protects the agent from all recurring 
forms of explicit or implicit command. 
If the agent included only the deterministic choice, 
it would be a simple program; if the nondeterministic 
choice were only present, the agent would not be 
autonomous because lacking in rationality and 
condemned to a chaotic behavior. 
It is to be noticed that within an agent, it is neither 
obligatory nor necessary that the two components of 
the choice module of an attribute must be spatially 
adjacent: according to the general architecture of the 
agent and the properties it implements, the 
deterministic choice can be a part of another 
component of the agent (for example, when several 
deterministic parts of choice modules of different 
attributes are located at the same place). Consequently, 
Figure 1 must be understood as an abstract 
representation of a choice module. 
 
4.2. An implementation example 
 
We have implemented a software agent immersed 
into a real environment (network of Linux systems), an 
agent autonomous with regard to the mobility and 
having to carry out the same task on each visited site. 
The purpose of this application was multiple: 
- To characterize in a fine way the various 
properties (qualities or attributes) present in the agent   
- To define and implement several migration 
policies   
- To study the realization of a complete choice 
module (i.e. containing deterministic and 
nondeterministic components) as well as its relations 
with the defined policies  
- To verify that the absence of the agent migration 
control by a user did not prevent the application from 
functioning correctly  
- To evaluate the potential of extension of this 
autonomy model. 
 
Agent task. The task carried out by the agent on 
each visited site consists in collecting the users’ names 
locally logged. Before finishing its execution, the 
agent transmits to the user by electronic mail the result 
of its various displacements, this result including the 
temporarily inaccessible sites (stopped machines), the 
sites prohibited to the agent (it does not have the 
necessary authorizations or the site presents an 
inappropriate execution environment). 
 
Navigation policies. The policies at the disposal of 
the agent are the random transfer (P1) and the circular 
navigation (P2). These moving policies were selected 
for the following reasons: 
- The random transfer offers the agent to randomly 
draw the name of the next site to be visited. This 
policy was introduced in order to differentiate it from 
the nondeterministic choice: in the first case, the 
random draw relates to the name of the next site to 
reach (i.e. a parameter of the policy), in the second 
case, the drawing of a policy among N (with N=2). 
- The circular navigation requires the 
implementation of a multi-hop mechanism which 
implies the construction of a route and to keep up to 
date the list of the sites to be visited. In this 
configuration of navigation, the follow-up of the agent 
is more complex because the "umbilical link" between 
the agent and its launching site is broken. Lastly, it 
makes it possible to implement the stop of a multi-hop 
policy during its execution after the agent choice. 
 
Choice module. The choice module breaks up into 
two strictly ordered contiguous levels and is 
materialized by the autonomous_choice function 
(written in a script language). For simplicity reasons in 
the design and in the functioning, the set of the 
navigation policies and the choice module are static: 
no policy is removed or added during the execution of 
the agent and the choice module (deterministic 
component and nondeterministic component) remains 
fixed during the lifespan of the agent.  
The function autonomous_choice sequentially calls 
two functions, deterministic_choice and 
nondeterministic_choice: 
 
function autonomous_choice 
{ 
    deterministic_choice 
    nondeterministic_choice 
} 
 
The deterministic_choice function selects or 
maintains the current navigation policy. There is a 
selection of a new policy when the preceding policy 
has finished, otherwise the current policy is 
maintained. After execution of this function, the policy 
Pi (1≤i≤2) is positioned (random or circular). It will be 
maintained or modified by the nondeterministic part. 
The nondeterministic part is implemented by the 
nondeterministic_choice function which provides a 
random choice among the three following possibilities: 
it preserves the policy fixed by the deterministic 
component (with the probability Pr1) or it forces the 
execution of the random policy (Pr2) or starts the 
empty policy P0 (Pr3). This one means that no 
navigation policy is activated. In our application, P0 
causes the end of the execution of the agent. Indeed, as 
the agent’s activity mainly consists in carrying out a 
service (a task) on the local site then to move, it was 
decided that when the empty policy would be started it 
would cause the stopping of the agent on its local site. 
In an application where the agent would be richer in 
properties, the empty navigation policy would allow 
the agent to continue its execution without moving, the 
future of the agent depending on the properties it 
integrates. 
 
Qualities and attributes of the agent. As well as 
autonomy (quality) and mobility (attribute), the agent 
integrates two other attributes, these two being relative 
to perception. The first is the perception by the agent 
of a clone of itself, i.e. a residual "incarnation" of the 
agent. The presence of this type of entity indicates a 
dysfunction of the application (and not the presence of 
a replication attribute into the agent). The second 
attribute is the site perception.  
The agent is autonomous with regard to the 
mobility and non autonomous with regard to the other 
two attributes relative to perception because for each 
one of them, the agent integrates only one use policy 
and no choice module. 
 
4.3. Possible extensions 
 
The work undertaken on autonomy with regard to 
an attribute offers several tracks to be explored or 
deepened. We will mention four of them: 
- To apply the model of autonomy to an attribute 
other than mobility. A candidate attribute already 
mentioned is the replication of the agent. It is also 
possible to build an agent autonomous with regard to 
the task it has to carry out  
- For a given attribute, to make the set of policies 
eligible by the choice module dynamic. That induces a 
more or less major modification of the two 
components of this module. If there is integration 
within the agent of one or more policies which are by 
design external to it, it can be interesting to provide the 
agent with a software architecture which makes it 
physically open [11]  
- To design an agent autonomous with regard to two 
different attributes. There are then two deterministic 
components and two nondeterministic components. A 
meticulous study of the interactions between the four 
components will have then to be undertaken. The 
problems to be resolved seem similar to those posed by 
the fitting or the organization into a hierarchy of 
autonomous subsystems within a broader entity, 
problems already identified in the biological and social 
fields [8]  
- To integrate in the agent various models of 
autonomy: autonomy with regard to an attribute and, 
for example, a model of social autonomy. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
As a quality, autonomy is a complex property, 
difficult to encircle. Nevertheless, it is possible to 
distinguish if an agent is or is not autonomous with 
regard to a particular attribute. By being nonsocial, the 
suggested autonomy model spares the introduction of 
an additional source of complexity in the guise of a 
second agent and with it, the complexity carried by the 
interactions which it can produce with the first agent. 
By being partial, it avoids contradictory 
interpretations: an agent is autonomous or non 
autonomous with regard to an attribute. Lastly, the 
model being built on the concepts of choice and uses 
policies, entities such as a thermostat or the xbiff 
daemon cannot be considered within this model as 
autonomous agents. Although provided with many 
assets, this model (like the others) does not exhaust all 
the richness of autonomy when it is considered as a 
quality.  
However, combining at the same time rational 
choice and non determinism, this model offers a 
conceptual framework making it possible to think how 
to implement a sort of freedom of an artificial agent. 
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